The guard makes the situation even more excruciating by informing Sophie that if she chooses neither, then both will be killed. With this added factor, Sophie has a morally compelling reason to choose one of her children. But for each child, Sophie has an apparently equally strong reason to save him or her. Thus the same moral precept gives rise to conflicting obligations. Some have called such cases symmetrical Sinnott-Armstrong , Chapter 2. We shall return to the issue of whether it is possible to preclude genuine moral dilemmas.
But what about the desirability of doing so? Why have ethicists thought that their theories should preclude the possibility of dilemmas? At the intuitive level, the existence of moral dilemmas suggests some sort of inconsistency. An agent caught in a genuine dilemma is required to do each of two acts but cannot do both.
And since he cannot do both, not doing one is a condition of doing the other. Thus, it seems that the same act is both required and forbidden. But exposing a logical inconsistency takes some work; for initial inspection reveals that the inconsistency intuitively felt is not present.
See Marcus and McConnell , Similarly rules that generate moral dilemmas are not inconsistent, at least on the usual understanding of that term. Kant, Mill, and Ross were likely aware that a dilemma-generating theory need not be inconsistent. Even so, they would be disturbed if their own theories allowed for such predicaments.
If this speculation is correct, it suggests that Kant, Mill, Ross, and others thought that there is an important theoretical feature that dilemma-generating theories lack. And this is understandable. It is certainly no comfort to an agent facing a reputed moral dilemma to be told that at least the rules which generate this predicament are consistent because there is a possible world in which they do not conflict. For a good practical example, consider the situation of the criminal defense attorney.
She is said to have an obligation to hold in confidence the disclosures made by a client and to be required to conduct herself with candor before the court where the latter requires that the attorney inform the court when her client commits perjury Freedman , Chapter 3.
It is clear that in this world these two obligations often conflict. It is equally clear that in some possible world—for example, one in which clients do not commit perjury—that both obligations can be satisfied. Knowing this is of no assistance to defense attorneys who face a conflict between these two requirements in this world. Ethicists who are concerned that their theories not allow for moral dilemmas have more than consistency in mind.
What is troubling is that theories that allow for dilemmas fail to be uniquely action-guiding. A theory can fail to be uniquely action-guiding in either of two ways: by recommending incompatible actions in a situation or by not recommending any action at all.
Theories that generate genuine moral dilemmas fail to be uniquely action-guiding in the former way. Theories that have no way, even in principle, of determining what an agent should do in a particular situation have what Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Since one of the main points of moral theories is to provide agents with guidance, that suggests that it is desirable for theories to eliminate dilemmas and gaps, at least if doing so is possible. But failing to be uniquely action-guiding is not the only reason that the existence of moral dilemmas is thought to be troublesome.
Just as important, the existence of dilemmas does lead to inconsistencies if certain other widely held theses are true. Here we shall consider two different arguments, each of which shows that one cannot consistently acknowledge the reality of moral dilemmas while holding selected and seemingly plausible principles. The first argument shows that two standard principles of deontic logic are, when conjoined, incompatible with the existence of moral dilemmas.
The first of these is the principle of deontic consistency. Intuitively this principle just says that the same action cannot be both obligatory and forbidden. Note that as initially described, the existence of dilemmas does not conflict with PC. But if we add a principle of deontic logic , then we obtain a conflict with PC:.
The first argument that generates inconsistency can now be stated. Premises 1 , 2 , and 3 represent the claim that moral dilemmas exist. And, of course, 9 and 11 are contradictory.
So if we assume PC and PD, then the existence of dilemmas generates an inconsistency of the old-fashioned logical sort. Here I take it to indicate physical necessity so that the appropriate connection with premise 3 can be made. And I take it that logical necessity is stronger than physical necessity. Two other principles accepted in most systems of deontic logic entail PC.
So if PD holds, then one of these additional two principles must be jettisoned too. The first says that if an action is obligatory, it is also permissible. The second says that an action is permissible if and only if it is not forbidden. These principles may be stated as:. The second argument that generates inconsistency, like the first, has as its first three premises a symbolic representation of a moral dilemma.
And like the first, this second argument shows that the existence of dilemmas leads to a contradiction if we assume two other commonly accepted principles.
Intuitively this says that if an agent is morally required to do an action, it must be possible for the agent to do it. This principle seems necessary if moral judgments are to be uniquely action-guiding.
We may represent this as. The other principle, endorsed by most systems of deontic logic, says that if an agent is required to do each of two actions, she is required to do both.
Now obviously the inconsistency in the first argument can be avoided if one denies either PC or PD. There is, of course, another way to avoid these inconsistencies: deny the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. It is fair to say that much of the debate concerning moral dilemmas in the last sixty years has been about how to avoid the inconsistencies generated by the two arguments above.
Opponents of moral dilemmas have generally held that the crucial principles in the two arguments above are conceptually true, and therefore we must deny the possibility of genuine dilemmas. See, for example, Conee and Zimmerman Most of the debate, from all sides, has focused on the second argument.
There is an oddity about this, however. When one examines the pertinent principles in each argument which, in combination with dilemmas, generates an inconsistency, there is little doubt that those in the first argument have a greater claim to being conceptually true than those in the second. One who recognizes the salience of the first argument is Brink , section V. But notice that the first argument shows that if there are genuine dilemmas, then either PC or PD must be relinquished.
Even most supporters of dilemmas acknowledge that PC is quite basic. Lemmon, for example, notes that if PC does not hold in a system of deontic logic, then all that remains are truisms and paradoxes Lemmon , p. There has been much debate about PD—in particular, questions generated by the Good Samaritan paradox—but still it seems basic. So those who want to argue against dilemmas purely on conceptual grounds are better off focusing on the first of the two arguments above.
But foes of dilemmas need not say this. Even if they believe that a conceptual argument against dilemmas can be made by appealing to PC and PD, they have several options regarding the second argument. Defenders of dilemmas need not deny all of the pertinent principles. If one thinks that each of the principles at least has some initial plausibility, then one will be inclined to retain as many as possible. A common response to the first argument is to deny PD. A more complicated response is to grant that the crucial deontic principles hold, but only in ideal worlds.
In the real world, they have heuristic value, bidding agents in conflict cases to look for permissible options, though none may exist Holbo , especially sections 15— Friends and foes of dilemmas have a burden to bear in responding to the two arguments above. For there is at least a prima facie plausibility to the claim that there are moral dilemmas and to the claim that the relevant principles in the two arguments are true.
Thus each side must at least give reasons for denying the pertinent claims in question. Opponents of dilemmas must say something in response to the positive arguments that are given for the reality of such conflicts. One reason in support of dilemmas, as noted above, is simply pointing to examples. First, any answer given to the question is likely to be controversial, certainly not always convincing. And second, this is a game that will never end; example after example can be produced.
The more appropriate response on the part of foes of dilemmas is to deny that they need to answer the question. Examples as such cannot establish the reality of dilemmas. Surely most will acknowledge that there are situations in which an agent does not know what he ought to do. This may be because of factual uncertainty, uncertainty about the consequences, uncertainty about what principles apply, or a host of other things.
So for any given case, the mere fact that one does not know which of two or more conflicting obligations prevails does not show that none does. Another reason in support of dilemmas to which opponents must respond is the point about symmetry.
As the cases from Plato and Sartre show, moral rules can conflict. But opponents of dilemmas can argue that in such cases one rule overrides the other. Most will grant this in the Platonic case, and opponents of dilemmas will try to extend this point to all cases. The branch of moral ethics questions how individuals develop their morality, why certain aspects of morality differ between cultures and why certain aspects of morality are generally universal.
Descriptive ethics is more scientific in its approach. It focuses on how human beings actually operate in the real world, rather than attempting to theorize about how they should operate. Deciding how to best resolve difficult moral and ethical dilemmas is never easy especially when any choice violates the societal and ethical standards by which we have been taught to govern our lives.
To learn more about these matters, explore the differences between ethics, morals and values. All rights reserved. Ethical Dilemma Situations Ethical dilemmas occur all too frequently in everyday life. Michael is deciding whether to tell Roger that Phyllis is married when he receives a call from Daniel. Daniel suspects his wife is having an affair. Since Daniel and his wife share many friends and contacts with Michael, Daniel asks if Michael has heard anything regarding an affair.
What should Michael do in this ethical dilemma? To whom does Michael owe greater friendship or loyalty in this situation? No matter who he tells, he knows that it is going to end up hurting one, if not both friends.
Should Michael reveal to Roger that Phyllis is married? Should Michael tell Daniel what he knows about Roger and Phyllis? Does that fact that Daniel asked him a direct question have an impact on what Michael should do? Should Michael speak up to both Daniel and Roger? Does he remain silent and hope his knowledge is never discovered? Life or Death Impact Consider a situation in which a group of people are enjoying an outdoor adventure together.
The group has to make an extremely difficult decision. Do they take an extreme action that will cost one member of the group her life? This service is more advanced with JavaScript available. Advertisement Hide. Open Access. First Online: 11 April Download chapter PDF. Morality and ethics play different roles in decision-making. The core difference can be outlined in the following manner: A person facing a challenging situation can have a moral intuition about what would be the right choice, based on personal moral convictions, more or less shared in the community or culture.
Kahneman divided these processes into System 1 thinking, which is quick and impulsive, and System 2 thinking, which is slow and analytical. When a person faces a morally challenging situation, he or she can draw upon the resources of both systems.
There may not be time for a full-scale analysis of the options at hand, however, and the person may have to rely on a gut feeling or moral impulse. Kahneman documented how people are prone to making mistakes when they rely solely on quick thinking and what their hearts tell them in the moment Kahneman, People can reap great benefits from activating the slower System 2 processes when weighing alternatives. However, those who rely too heavily on analysis can become passive and immobile in situations that call for rapid responses.
In some cases, by the time that an action has been thoroughly considered, it is too late to take the correct course. Like Anne, Ben acknowledged that, regardless of what he decided to do, it would be wrong.
Brinkmann, J. Understanding insurance customer dishonesty: Outline of a situational approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 61 2 , — CrossRef Google Scholar. Goodpaster, K. Business ethics. Becker Eds. New York: Garland Publishing. Google Scholar. Gowans, C. Innocence lost. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kahneman, D. Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kidder, R. How good people make tough choices.
New York: Morrow. Moral courage: Taking action when your values are put to the test. New York: William Morrow. Leadership and moral neutralisation. Leadership, 10 4 , — Ethical navigation in leadership training.
Etikk i praksis-Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 1 , 58— Maclagan, P. Varieties of moral issue and dilemma: A framework for the analysis of case material in business ethics education. Journal of Business Ethics, 48 1 , 21— To value something means that we hold it dear and feel it has worth to us. Often, values are ideas that we aspire to achieve, like equality and social justice. Morals describe a behavioral code of conduct to which an individual ascribes. Finally, laws and agency policies are often involved in complex cases, and social workers are often legally obligated to take a particular course of action.
Standard 1. There is considerably less recognition of the supremacy of agency policy in the Code, and Ethical Standard 3. It is also essential that the distinction be made between personal and professional ethics and values Congress, ; Wilshere, Conflicts between personal and professional values should not be considered ethical dilemmas for a number of reasons.
Because values involve feelings and are personal, the rational process used for resolving ethical dilemmas cannot be applied to values conflicts. Further, when an individual elects to become a member of a profession, he or she is agreeing to comply with the standards of the profession, including its Code of Ethics and values. Therefore, although they can be difficult and uncomfortable, conflicts involving personal values should not be considered ethical dilemmas.
For example, a social worker in a rural community with limited mental health care services is consulted on a client with agoraphobia, an anxiety disorder involving a fear of open and public spaces. Denying to see the patient then would be potentially in conflict with our commitment to promote the well-being of clients Ethical Standard 1. This is a pure ethical dilemma because two ethical standards conflict.
It can be resolved by looking at Ethical Standard 4. However, there are some complicated situations that require a decision but may also involve conflicts between values, laws, and policies. For example, an approximate dilemma occurs when a social worker is legally obligated to make a report of child or domestic abuse and has concerns about the releasing of information.
The social worker may experience tension between the legal requirement to report and the desire to respect confidentiality.
However, because the NASW Code of Ethics acknowledges our obligation to follow legal requirements and to intervene to protect the vulnerable, technically, there is no absolute ethical dilemma present. However, the social worker experiences this as a dilemma of some kind and needs to reach some kind of resolution.
Breaking the situation down and identifying the ethics, morals, values, legal issues, and policies involved as well as distinguishing between personal and professional dimensions can help with the decision-making process in approximate dilemmas.
Table 1 at beginning of this article is an illustration of how these factors might be considered. When writing an ethical dilemma paper or when attempting to resolve an ethical dilemma in practice, social workers should determine if it is an absolute or approximate dilemma; distinguish between personal and professional dimensions; and identify the ethical, moral, legal, and values considerations in the situation.
After conducting this preliminary analysis, an ethical decision-making model can then be appropriately applied. Allen, K. Affective learning: A taxonomy for teaching social work values. Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, 7 2.
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